Cicero on Temperament
Cicero On Duties 1.107, 110-11, 114-17 (trans. Long, pg. 424).
(1) It should also be understood that nature has endowed us with two roles, as it were. One of these is universal, from the fact that we all share in reason and that status which raises us above the beasts; this is the source of all rectitude and propriety, and the basis of the rational discovery of our proper functions. (2) The second role is the one which has been specifically assigned to individuals. Just as there are great bodily differences between people . . . so too there are still greater mental divergences . . . (3) To secure that propriety more easily which we are seeking, each person should firmly hold on to those characteristics of his which are not vicious but peculiar to himself. For we must so act that we do nothing in opposition to human nature in general, and yet, while keeping that secure, follow our own nature. Thus, even if a different course would be more dignified and superior, we should still regulate our own pursuits by the rule of our own nature. For it is pointless to resist one's own nature and pursue something which one cannot attain . . . (4) The whole essence of propriety is quite certainly consistency, both in life as a whole and in individual actions, and you cannot secure this if you imitate other people's nature and overlook your own . . . (5) Each person therefore should get to know his own temperament and show himself an acute judge of his own merits and weaknesses . . . (6) We shall work most effectively, then, at those things to which we are best suited. But if we are sometimes shoved by circumstances into roles which are not germane to our temperament, we should give all our thought, effort and attention to performing them, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible . . . (7) To the above-mentioned two roles, a third is appended, which some chance or circumstance imposes: and a fourth as well, which we take upon ourselves by our own decision. Headships of state, military commands, noble birth, public office, wealth, resources and their opposites depend on chance and are ruled by circumstances. But what role we ourselves are willing take on depends on our own free choice. Hence some take up philosophy, others civil law, others oratory, and people differ as to which virtues they prefer to excel in . . . (8) Above all we must decide who and what sort of people we want to be, and what kind of life we want to lead; and this is the most difficult question of all.
Long, A. A., Sedley, D. N. (1987). The Hellenistic
Philosophers: vol. 1. translations of the principle
sources with philosophical commentary. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
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